While some scholars argue that …scal decentralization gave Chinese local governors strong incentives to promote local economic growth, traditional …scal federalism theories are not directly relevant to explain such an e¤ect in the particular context of China. In this paper, we explain the existence of competition among Chinese local o¢ cials using a model of yardstick competition "from the top." In this model, the central government (rather than local voters) creates competition among local o¢ cials by rewarding or punishing them on the basis of relative performance in providing public spending. Our theoretical framework predicts that, in this context, the central government involves strategic interactions among local governors. Then, by estimating a spatial lag dynamic model for a panel data of 29 Chinese provinces from 1980 to 2004, we provide empirical evidence of the existence of such public spending interactions. We propose a rigorous empirical framework which takes into account heterogeneity, endogeneity problems and spatial error dependence. The results suggest that there actually are strategic interactions among Chinese provinces.
Introduction
China's remarkable growth in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with …scal decentralization so that some scholars like Zhuravskaya (2000) argue that the latter gave Chinese local o¢ cials strong incentives to promote local economic growth, creating a basis for nationwide high economic performance. This paper proposes an explanation for the existence of such competition between Chinese local governments by considering a yardstick competition "from the top," in which the central government creates competition among local governors by judging them on the basis of relative performance in providing public spending.
Fiscal decentralization has been a critical component of economic reform in China but "Chinese style decentralization" is actually conceptually di¤erent from decentralization in many other countries. First, China's current …scal system is largely decentralized while its governance structure is rather centralized with strong top-down mandates and a uniform governance structure. According to Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) , it can be described as a multidivisional-form hierarchy structure in which the central government exerts great in ‡u-ence on the local administrations'actions. 1 Second, the power of provincial governments is not based on a system of electoral representation: the governors are appointed by the central government in Beijing. 2 Lastly, population mobility between provinces still limited in spite of the relaxations of the Hukou system. 3 In traditional …scal federalism theory, decentralization is supposed to increase the e¢ ciency of public spending by inducing competition between local o¢ cials, through a "vote with feet" or a "yardstick competition" created by local voters. In China, traditional disciplining devices such as local elections and exit option are not available. Hence, fundamentally, these theories are not relevant in this context. Following Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) , we argue that vertical control can ensure accountability of local governors and induce interjurisdictional competition. Indeed, Tsui (2005) describes how Chinese provincial leaders operate within a well-de…ned career structure 1 China's intergovernmental relations are a hierarchical system of bureaucratic control where provincial governments must accept the uni…ed leadership of the State Council which has the power to decide on the division of responsibilities and to annul inappropriate decisions and orders of provincial governments. A representative of the Communist Party of China is appointed by their supervisors and acts as the policy maker. The Party Secretary is always in precedence above the leader of the People's Government. 2 We can note that there are elections at village level. 3 The Hukou system is a household registration system which imposes strict limits on Chinese citizens changing their permanent place of residence.
inside the political hierarchy. They undergo detailed performance reviews by their superiors, and are rewarded or penalized according to their success in achieving speci…c targets. Promotions, demotions, and job-related bene…ts all depend on such reviews, which have become increasingly formal. 4 Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) actually show that provincial o¢ cials are more often promoted to the Party's Central Committee if their province's relative growth rate increases. Similarly, Li and Zhou (2005) examined the careers of top o¢ cials in 28 provinces from 1979 to 1995 and found that promotions are signi…cantly more likely in provinces with higher growth. Local governors may consider the risk of damaging their careers since the probability of their reappointment depends on how well they perform in ful…lling their mandates from above. So career concerns may create strong incentives to improve local economic performance, as in democratic countries. The idea that the performance of local governments can be evaluated by making comparisons between them was previously proposed by Salmon (1987) and formally developed by Besley and Case (1995) . Here we modify the model of the latter to apply yardstick competition to China. This competition is not "from the bottom" but "from the top" since the principal is the central government, and not the local voting populations. While Besley and Case (1995) provide a model of political economy of tax-setting, we focus on public spending choices. Indeed, although provincial autonomy in managing …scal resources is controversial, everybody agrees that they have a lot of freedom as regards the amount of their extrabudgetary …nancing and, hence, to determine the amount of their public expenditure. In this way, we propose a possible explanation of the existence of competition among Chinese local governments despite the absence of electoral accountability and population mobility.
Firstly this paper develops a model of public spending choices in a multijurisdictional world with asymmetric information, where the central government makes comparisons between local governors to overcome political agency problems. As in the traditional yardstick competition model, information spillovers from other jurisdictions a¤ect the delivery of public services in a jurisdiction. Thus, when the central government uses neighboring performance to judge a governor, the latter is encouraged to consider neighboring …scal decisions so that we should observe strategic interactions among local decision-makers. Moreover, we show that we should not observe such strategic interactions in a centralized …scal system. Secondly this paper estimates a spatial lag model for a panel data of 29 Chinese provinces from 1980 to 2004 taking into account heterogeneity, endogeneity problems and spatial error dependence to test the theoretical model's predictions. To our knowledge, this study is the …rst attempt to test public spending interactions in China. Indeed, most of the empirical literature focuses on strategic interactions with respect to taxes in developed countries. Little attention has been paid to the public expenditure side, 5 especially in developing or emerging countries. 6 Our empirical analysis actually provides evidence of the existence of strategic interactions among Chinese local governments operating in a vertical bureaucratic control system. We also show that such interactions are reinforced by a higher degree of …scal decentralization.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a theoretical model of yardstick competition "from the top;" Section 3 estimates a spatial lag model for a panel data of 29
Chinese provinces from 1980 to 2004 to test the existence of public spending interactions. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework: Yardstick competition "from the top" Besley and Case (1995) introduced yardstick competition between governments as a discipline device for rent-seeking politicians in the context of a developed and democratic country. This paper modi…es the traditional approach by considering a model of yardstick competition "from the top" and by focusing on public spending choices to apply yardstick competition to the particular context of China. Moreover, while Besley and Case (1995) focus on the e¤ect of yardstick competition on the probability of being reelected, we focus on its e¤ect on the 5 We can mention the works of Redoano (2007) or Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008) . They …nd that some interactions take place among neighboring jurisdictions with respect to expenditures for EU countries and French municipalities respectively. 6 Akin, Hutchinson, and Strumpf (2005) analyze the decentralization of health care provision in Uganda and provide evidence for the hypothesis that spillover e¤ects cause spending on public goods in one district to reduce spending in neighboring districts. Arze, Martinez-Vasquez, and Puwanti (2008) focus on local discretionary expenditures in Indonesia and highlight strategic complementarity of local public spending. Caldeira, Foucault, and Rota-Graziosi (2008) have also found strategic complementarity among local public spending among Beninese municipalities. existence of strategic interactions among local governments.
The model
Following Besley and Case (1995) , we consider a principal/agent model.
1. The agents are local o¢ cials. They are assumed to know more about the short term economic shocks at local level than do the central government.
2. The principal here is the central government. It is assumed to use performance indicators of neighboring local o¢ cials as a benchmark to appraise whether agents waste resources and deserve to remain in o¢ ce.
3. The main incentive mechanisms used to discipline governors are reappointment (instead of elections). The central government decides whether or not to reappoint an agent.
We consider a jurisdiction whose local government provides public services of a given quality (G i ) …nanced by taxes (t). The …nal level of …scal revenue is t k , with k , the product stochastic and observed only by the local government. k can take three values:
high (H), medium (M ) or low (L) with probabilities p H ; p M and p L , which are assumed to be evenly spaced with di¤erence t . 7
The local governments are potentially of two kinds: it can be "good" (g) with probability or "bad" (b) with probability (1 ). We assume that 1 2 . 8 Agent's strategies are denoted by G( k ; T ); with k (H; M ; L) and T (g; b). Good local governors do not rentseeking or waste resources while bad ones do. The latter can subtract 0; or 2 as rent or waste. Formally, we have:
and
with r i , the rent.
7 Note that three levels of product are necessary to obtain interesting results. 8 This hypothesis will allow us to highlight the discipline e¤ect of the yardstick competition. Indeed, if < 1 2
; under yardstick competition, bad local governments will never reduce their rent since the central government won't be willing to reappoint them even if they both reduce their rent (see Section 2.3.2).
As in Besley and Case (1995) , we consider two time periods with a discount factor satisfying 1 2 < < 1. The central government observes public spending decisions and reviews its belief that the agent is good using Bayes' rule. 9 Hence it chooses whether or not to reappoint him since it wants to maximize public spending for a given level of taxes in period 2. The central government strategy is denoted by
which corresponds to the probability that it reappoints a local governor who sets a public spending level G i : A bad local o¢ cial chooses public spending to maximize his discount utility which depends positively on the rent in period 1 and on expected rent in period 2:
A bad o¢ cial who is reappointed sets no period 2 discipline and takes a rent equal to 2 . 10 So, he contemplates between the rent in period 1 and the expected rent in period 2. 11
The centralized …scal system
As a benchmark, we …rst consider the case in which the …scal system is centralized. All tax revenues are collected by the central government at local level and transferred back to local governments according to a spending plan made by the center. It corresponds to the perfect information case. Formally, we have:
with G i , the level of public spending, C i ; the …scal revenue transferred by the central government and r i , the rent. In this case, a local governor who sets a level of public spending lower 9 Note that we can easily consider that the central government has no capacity to make a credible precommitment on transparent rules of career evolution depending on …scal performance only. Indeed, promotions of a close relative of the leaders of the central government are common in China. For instance, recently, Li Xiaopeng, the son of former Chinese premier Li Peng was promoted to governor of Hunan province.
1 0 More generally, 2 can be considered as a reward to behave as a good governor in period 1 such as a promotion.
1 1 Note that it is assumed that there is no sanction, i.e., a local governor is not bound to give back what he took as a rent in period 1. than the …scal revenue transferred by the central government will be automatically seen as a bad local governor and will not be reappointed. Strict dominance arguments rule out any equilibrium in which G(C i ; b) = C i ( = 0) as long as < 1: Then, providing G i = C i gets less rent with no gain in the probability of staying governor so that bad local governors are not encouraged to reduce their rent and take 2 :
Lemma 1
Under perfect information a centralized …scal system is characterized by:
(ii) Bad governors set:
(iii) Central government sets:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1
In this case, the information about the nature of the local government is revealed. Yardstick competition is useless and has no e¤ect on local o¢ cials'public spending choices which
are independent of what other agents are doing.
Proposition 1
Under our assumptions, when the …scal system is centralized, there is no horizontal strategic interaction.
The decentralized …scal system
We now consider a decentralized case with asymmetric information between the local o¢ cials and the central government. The nature selects the type of the local governor and the product. We deduce …ve possible public spending levels,
A good governor always provides public spending consistent with the true level of tax revenue:
A bad governor can choose to take no rent, a rent of or 2 . According to the products, the level of public spending can be:
The following table sums up the possible levels of public spending: 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium without yardstick competition
We consider …rst one jurisdiction and we …nd Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the public spending game.
With < 1, strict dominance argument rules out any equilibrium where
Moreover, the central government will always believe that a local government who sets G 4 or G 5 is bad, so that (G 4 ) = (G 5 ) = 0. Hence, by applying strict dominance rule, a bad governor will always take a maximal rent when the product is low:
a bad governor takes a reduction in rent when the product is medium ( M ) in order to be reappointed:
observing G 3 , using Bayes' rule, the central government is willing to reappoint the local government if p L > 1=2, a high enough value for it to be su¢ ciently likely that a governor who chooses G 3 is actually good. Hence, since > 1=2, the governor is encouraged to reduce his rent when the product is medium ( M ) to be reappointed, setting no discipline and a rent equal to 2 in period 2: On the contrary, when the product is high ( H ), it is worse o¤ playing G 2 since it gets less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment so that a bad governor takes a maximal rent when the product is high:
The following proposition illustrates Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in an interesting and simple case: p L > 1=2.
Lemma 2
Under asymmetric information, without yardstick competition, if p L > 1=2, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is:
(i) A bad local governor sets:
(ii) Central government sets:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2
Without yardstick competition, a local governor can be encouraged to reduce his rent to be reappointed. But, local governments' public spending choices are independent of what other local o¢ cials are doing.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with yardstick competition
We now consider two neighboring jurisdictions with identical environments and shocks in which appointed o¢ cials may be of di¤erent types. We analyze the e¤ect of the central government's information about public spending in both jurisdictions. Like Besley and Case (1995) , we assume that local o¢ cials know each other's types. 12 We keep considering the case where p L > 1=2 to compare equilibrium with and without yardstick competition. We note (G i jG j ) the probability that the central government reappoints a local governor i who sets a public spending level G i , observing a level G j in the neighboring local jurisdiction j and G( H ; T i jT j ) the strategy of the local governor i who knows the type of its neighboring local government j. We have three cases to consider (see Appendix A.1.3).
First, if both local governments are good, both set public spending equal to t k , k
Second, if both local governments are bad, both local governors choosing the same strategy gives the central government more con…dence that they are good. In particular, it is now willing to reappoint a governor if it observes G 3 in both jurisdictions if p L > 1 .
This condition is weaker than the previous one since, by assumption, 1=2. Hence, both bad governors act in the same way and reduce their rent when the product is medium to be reappointed. It follows that local governors are better able to make the central government believe that both are good by choosing the same strategy. In this case, yardstick competition involves a discipline e¤ect which leads bad governments to increase the level of public spending in period 1.
Third, we consider the case where one local government is good and the other is bad.
In this case, the bad incumbent will be found out by providing a level of public spending above his neighbor. Hence, when the product is medium ( M ) playing G 3 now results in being unseat. A bad government can no longer reduce its rent when M to be reappointed:
it takes a maximal rent when M :
The good local government in ‡icts an externality on the bad one, reducing the latter's reappointment chances. In this case, the yardstick competition separates good governments from bad governments (selection e¤ect)
but involves a decrease of public spending in period 1.
Lemma 3
Under asymmetric information, with yardstick competition, if p L > 1=2, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is:
(i) If both local governments are good, they both set:
If both local governments are bad, they both set:
If one local government is good and the other is bad, they set:
(ii) The central government sets:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3
Our results are similar to those of Besley and Case (1995) and we distinguish the two e¤ects of the yardstick competition highlighted by Canegrati (2006): the discipline e¤ect and the selection e¤ect. When both local o¢ cials are bad, choosing the same strategy gives the central government more con…dence that governors are good so that bad local o¢ cials decide, as soon as possible, to both reduce their rent. When one local o¢ cial is good and another is bad, the bad governor always takes a maximal rent since it has no chance to be reappointed by reducing its rent. Finally, when the central government makes comparisons between local jurisdictions, local o¢ cials care about what other local governments are doing since it a¤ects its own probability of being reappointed.
Proposition 2
Under our assumptions, the yardstick competition "from the top" involves horizontal strategic interactions among neighboring local governments.
We can note that there is no common agreement about the ability of the yardstick competition to reach citizens'welfare. Economists who believe that government is benevolent are prone to see intergovernmental competition as a source of negative externalities which lowers welfare. On the contrary, the public choice perspective which regards governments as Leviathan sees yardstick competition as potentially bene…cial for welfare (Besley and Smart, 2002) . Brülhart and Jametti (2007) support the view that tax competition can be a second-best form of welfare enhancement by constraining the scope for public-sector revenue maximization. They …nd evidence of welfare-increasing "Leviathan taming". Economic theory also provides statements of the conditions under which tax competition may be "a force for good" or "a force for bad". 13 Belle ‡amme and Hindriks (2005) analyze the role of yardstick competition for improving political decisions and …nd a generally neutral result. In our case, it is straightforward to show that the total level of public spending provided with tax held …xed is higher with yardstick competition: it is lower in period 1 but this e¤ect is o¤set in period 2 since bad local governors are less likely to be reappointed. 14 3 Empirical evidence of strategic interactions among Chinese provincial governments
Our theoretical framework shows that the yardstick competition "from the top" involves strategic interactions among neighboring local governments (Proposition 2). Hence, …rst, we empirically test the existence of such horizontal strategic interactions in determining public spending. We do not pretend that strategic interactions always arise through a yardstick competition only. But, in the Chinese context, such interactions cannot arise through traditional channels like population mobility or electoral discipline so that we can argue that a yardstick competition "from the top" should be the principal source of strategic interactions.
Second, according to Proposition 1, when the …scal system is centralized, we should not observe any horizontal strategic interactions. Empirically, we test the e¤ect of the degree of centralization on the existence of horizontal strategic interactions. Before that, we provide an overview of the decentralization process in China and some descriptive statistics.
Decentralization in China
The basic hypothesis of our analysis is that the Chinese provinces acquired an autonomous budgetary power which allows them to determine the amount of their spending. One of the major objectives of the …scal reform was to make local governments …scally self-su¢ cient (see Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005) for a detailed overview of the decentralization process in China.). Provincial governments have been given considerable latitude in shaping local 1 3 Edwards and Keen (1996) , for instance, show that the net welfare e¤ect of tax competition hinges on the relative magnitude of two parameters: the marginal excess burden of taxation and the government's marginal ability to divert tax revenue for its own uses.
1 4 This is true as soon as > Before 1979, China practiced a "unitarian budgetary system" (tongshou tongzhi ). This …scal system was characterized by centralized revenue collection and centralized …scal transfers. Most taxes and pro…ts were collected by local governments and were remitted to the central government, and then in part transferred back to the local governments according to expenditure needs approved by the center. This system was in accord with the planned economy. The …scal decentralization policy was implemented in 1980. The highly centralized system was changed into a revenue-sharing system called "…scal contracting system" (caizheng chengbao zhi ). Although the central government retained the responsibility for de…ning the …scal system, the administration and the collection of taxes were widely devolved to provinces. There were three basic types of revenue under this reformed system: central revenues that accrue to the center, local revenues that accrue to the local governments, and shared revenues. Actually, during this period, the local governments controlled the e¤ective tax rates and bases by o¤ering varying degrees of tax concessions to enterprises and shifted budgetary funds to extrabudgetary funds. 16 This period is generally considered as one of great autonomy for provincial governments. From 1980 to 1993, the central government's share of total budgetary revenue declined from 51 percent to 28 percent. Hence, the central government decided in late 1993, to replace this system with a "separating tax system", a system of allocation of the various categories of taxes between the center and the provinces.
The center and provinces became responsible for the administration and collection of their own taxes. To a certain extent, the reform may have strengthened the …scal autonomy of provinces. Indeed, local governments'tax revenue no longer depends on negotiation with the center, provincial taxes have an important …scal potential and the provinces bene…t from tax revenues they collect.
Provincial autonomy results in a very di¤erent …scal e¤ort from one province to another and in the existence of de…cits during the execution of the budgets (Bahl, 1999) . Moreover, although provincial …scal autonomy evolution from one reform to another is controversial, everybody agrees that they have a lot of freedom as regards the amount of their extrabudgetary spending. In spite of their name, these …scal revenues belong to the budget since provinces plan formally to collect them and to spend them. 17 The development of the extrabudgetary …nancing illustrates central government's tolerance of the …scal initiatives of local governments (Zhang, 1999) . Hence, local governments are not deprived of their freedom to determine the amount of their public expenditure. Capital expenditure also represents an important (but unstable) share of public spending.
Descriptive statistics
Over the past 30 years, China has transformed itself, posting extraordinary rates of growth. At the same time, it has become a far less equal nation, with vast di¤erences emerging between those living in rural and urban areas or inland and coastal areas. In particular, incomes in coastal areas have grown faster than in inland provinces, opening a coastal-inland income gap that has widened continuously. This pattern is not surprising given 1 7 In 1978, total extra-budgetary revenue was about 10% of the GDP while total budgetary revenue was about 31%. In 1993, the extra-budgetary revenue was up to 16% of the GDP and the budgetary revenue was down to 16% of the GDP (Statistical Yearbook of China, 1995) . 1 8 We excluded the Xizang region (Tibet) since data are likely to be overvalued. Moreover, in 1997, Chongqing separated from Sichuan to become an independent prefecture in its own right but we have no data for this prefecture before 1997. So, we have combined Chongqing with Sichuan. that much of China's recent economic development was led by rapidly expanding exports, …nanced to a considerable extent by foreign direct investment. Local governments play an essential role in providing social services. However, many local governments, especially those in poor western regions, are providing fewer and lower quality public services. Regarding total public spending we see that coastal provinces account for 65% of the total local governments' expenditure. The distribution of per capita central transfers by province increases these inequalities: Shanghai, the richest province, is the largest recipient of central transfers per capita in 2004 (5,079 yuan) while Henan, a relatively poor province, is the smallest one (646 yuan).
Finally, the level of public spending seems to be largely spatially correlated due to spatial heterogeneity of provinces. Our empirical framework consists of testing the existence of substantive strategic interaction between Chinese neighboring local governments. We have to ascertain that the observed spatial auto-correlation can be attributed to a real strategic interaction process among local authorities and not to exogenous correlation in omitted provinces characteristics or common shocks to local …scal policy.
3.3 Are there public spending interactions among Chinese provinces?
Econometric framework
To test the existence of horizontal strategic interactions, in line with earlier literature, we consider a speci…cation in which (the log of) public expenditure in province i in year t, G it , is a function of (the log of) its neighbors' public spending, G jt . 19 We allow G it to depend on a vector of speci…c controls X it and we include a province-speci…c e¤ect i .
where i = 1; : : : ; n denotes a province and t = 1; : : : ; T a time period, ij , and i are unknown parameter vectors and " it a random error. All time-invariant community characteristics, observed or unobserved are represented by i . Since there are too many parameters ij to be estimated, we consider:
where A jt = X w ij :G it is the weighted average vector of public spending in the set of neighbors local governments j at time t.
The …rst problem concerns the way the neighbors of a province are de…ned. An 'a priori' set of interactions has to be de…ned. We try to rely on insights derived from our theoretical model. In the latter, the central government introduces a yardstick competition among local jurisdictions which are comparable, with identical environments and shocks. A scheme that assigns weights based on geographical proximity is commonly used in the empirical literature of interjurisdictional interactions and seems to be particularly relevant in China weighting scheme gives us a useful benchmark to ascertain that the potential observed spatial auto-correlation can be attributed to a substantive strategic interaction process and not to some general positive correlation between all public spending generated by omitted common shocks. 22 Following Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) , Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008), Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Redoano (2007) , we introduce the lagged dependent variable, G it 1 , as a right hand side in order to take into account persistency in public expenditure:
2 0 Weights wij are given by 1=dij where dij is the Euclidian distance between provinces i and j for j 6 = i. 2 1 We generate a random number distributed between 0 and 1 for each province. Then, the value 1 is assigned if the di¤erence between random numbers of two provinces is higher than 0.5 and 0 otherwise. 2 2 Weights are normalized so that their sum equals unity for each i for all weight matrices. This assumes that spatial interactions are homogeneous: each neighbor has the same impact on the province.
Lastly, we introduce speci…c control variables commonly used in the relevant empirical literature to avoid exogenous correlation in omitted provinces characteristics or shocks to local …scal policy which may generate spatial error dependence and provide false evidence of strategic interaction,
where P it is the population density of province i in year t, which captures the possibility of economies of scale in public spending and may be spatially distributed, 23 Gr it is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate in province i in year t; which controls for common shocks spatially correlated, U it is the fraction of urban population in the total population of provinces, knowing that urbanization is spatially distributed and may increase public spending needs in particular in terms of infrastructures (Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hua, 2001 and Rodrik, 1998) , O it is a trade openness measure 24 at provincial level which could have many e¤ects on public …nances, 25 as well as F it , the foreign direct investment in ‡ow in province i in year t. T t is a trend variable which captures a common trend for all provinces. 26 We also introduce C it , the central government transfers for province i in year t, the centre may want to transfer more resources to increase spending in a speci…c part of the country. The central government transfers are introduced as control variable only as a robustness check, this data reducing our observations number since it is available only from 1995 to 2004. 27 In estimating equation 9 we are confronted with important econometric issues (Brueckner, 2003) . First, as already mentioned, the omission of explanatory variables that are spatially dependent may generate spatial dependence in the error term. When spatial error dependence 2 3 Per capita expenditures and population are in logarithmic terms. 2 4 We measure the trade openness as a ratio of total foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GDP as it is most often used in empirical studies.
2 5 In particular, Rodrik (1998) shows that there is a positive correlation between an economy's exposure to international trade and the size of its government because government spending plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to a signi…cant amount of external risk.
2 6 We cannot introduce time dummies since we use GMM System with external instruments and we have too many instruments with time dummies. However, introduce a trend is a good way to ascertain that the potential observed spatial auto-correlation can be attributed to an interaction process and not to a "common trend". Indeed, Manski (1993) suggests that …scal choices appear to be interdependent not because jurisdictions behave strategically but because they actually follow a "common trend"that drives …scal choices in the same directions. is ignored, estimation can provide false evidence of strategic interactions. To deal with this problem, one possible approach is to use the maximal likelihood (ML) estimator, taking into account the error structure or the instrumental variables (IV) method which yields consistent estimates even with spatial error dependence (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998) . 28 Saavedra (2000) or Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008) use the robust tests of Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon (1996) to verify the hypothesis of error independence. 29 Secondly, because of strategic interactions, public expenditure in di¤erent provinces is jointly determined: if local governments react to each others'spending choices, neighbors'decisions are endogenous and correlated with the error term " it . In this case, ordinary least squares estimation of the parameters is inconsistent, requiring alternative estimation methods based on the IV method or on the ML. 30 Under IV approach, a typical procedure is to use the weighted average of neighbors' control variables as instruments (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998) . Lastly, since we introduce the lagged dependent variable as a right hand side to consider the autoregressive component of the time series, the previous estimators are inconsistent (Nickell, 1984) .
We propose to use the GMM-System estimator in addition to the IV estimator of the spatial coe¢ cient, after verifying the hypothesis of error independence and estimating the static model with ML estimator. As for the neighbors' spending decisions, we use the weighted average of neighbors'control variables, i.e., their socio-economic characteristics (w ij X jt ), as instruments. The GMM estimators allow controlling for both unobserved country-speci…c effects and potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 31 The GMM-System estimator combines in one system, the regressions in di¤erence and the regressions in level. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this extended GMM estimator is preferable to that of Arellano and Bond (1991) when the dependent variable, the independent variables, or both are persistent.
2 8 Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) or Brueckner (1998) use the maximum likelihood approach. Brett and Pinkse (2000) , Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid (1999) and Buettner (2001) are examples of empirical studies that use the IV approach to estimate spatial coe¢ cients.
2 9 The use of panel helps to eliminate spatial error dependence which arises through spatial autocorrelation of omitted variables which are time-invariant.
3 0 The ML method consists of using a non-linear optimization routine to estimate the spatial coe¢ cient (Brueckner, 2003) .
3 1 There are conceptual and statistical shortcomings with the …rst-di¤erence GMM estimator as it exacerbates the bias due to errors in variables (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984) . Thus, we use an alternative system estimator that reduces the potential biases and imprecision associated with the usual di¤erence estimators Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998) and also greatly reduces the …nite sample bias.
Results
To investigate whether spatial lag or spatial error dependence are the more likely sources of correlation, we use two robust tests (for spatial lag dependence and for spatial error dependence) based on the Lagrange Multiplier principle for panel data (Anselin, Le Gallo, and Jayet, 2006) . As shown in the Table 2 (see Appendix A.2.2), spatial tests indicate the presence of spatial lag dependence for public spending but not the existence of spatial error dependence for both matrices. As the hypothesis of error independence is veri…ed, we estimate equation (9) using ML with speci…c-e¤ects for both contiguity and distance matrices without taking into account the lagged value of our dependent variable ( = 0).
The estimation results are shown in Table 2 . In these …rst estimations, the coe¢ cient of the weighted average vector of public expenditure in the set of other local governments is always signi…cant and positive for both matrices.
We then estimate with GMM-System the dynamic model (equation 9) for both weighting schemes taking into account the lagged value of our dependent variable ( 6 = 0). We adopt the assumption of weak exogeneity of GDP growth rate, trade openness, foreign direct investment in ‡ow and central government transfers and the assumption of strict exogeneity of other explanatory variables. 32 As noted before, the weighted average vector of per capita public spending in other provinces is also instrumented by the weighted average of neighbors'control variables. We collapse instruments and limit their number since too many instruments leads to inaccurate estimation of the optimal weight matrix, biased standard errors and, therefore, incorrect inference in overidenti…cation tests (see Roodman, 2009 ). 33 Table 3 shows these estimation results for distance matrix and Table 4 for contiguity matrix (see Appendix A.2.2).
The consistency of GMM-System estimator is given by two speci…cation tests (Arellano and Bond, 1991) : the Hansen test and the serial correlation of residuals tests. Here, we conclude that orthogonality conditions are correct and instruments used valid. We introduce the control variables progressively to check the robustness of our results. We can also note that 3 2 Population density, trend and urbanization rate. 3 3 The lags of at least two periods earlier for weak exogenous variables and three periods earlier for endogenous variables are used as instruments. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier.
We use two lags for endogenous and weak exogenous variables. Note that we consider external instruments as weak exogenous but we use only one lag when the number of instruments exceeds the number of units. the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable is always signi…cant and positive. As this coe¢ cient provides an estimated varying between 0.45 and 0.89 signi…cant at 1% level, the result indicates persistency of public expenditure and con…rms the consistency of the autoregressive speci…cation.
The coe¢ cient of the weighted average vector of public expenditure in the set of other provinces is signi…cant at least at 5% level and positive for both matrices. Moreover, it is robust and relatively stable with the introduction of the control variables. However, if we continue to …nd evidence of strategic interactions with the placebo matrix, it would cast doubt on our claim that we have found evidence of public spending interactions. But we see from Table 4 (last column), that placebo matrix do not show any evidence of positive strategic interactions. This shows that the phenomenon of …scal interactions detected with geographical matrices is not an artefact of the estimation procedure. So, we can conclude that there are strategic interactions between Chinese provinces and that public expenditure seem to be strategic complements: an average public spending increase of 10% in the neighboring provinces induces an increase of around 5,9% with the distance matrix and 2,8% with the contiguity matrix in provincial expenditure. 34 These results are similar to those obtained in previous tests carried out in other countries. 35
Extension
Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) and Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008) suggested that there is no reason to assume that patterns of expenditure interdependence are identical for all categories of public spending. So, we extend our empirical analysis by testing the existence of horizontal strategic interactions for each category of public spending. Results are provided in Tables 5 and 6 (see Appendix A.2.3) for distance and contiguity matrices. Regarding 3 4 As expected, the parameter associated with population is negative and signi…cant: it indicates the presence of economies of scale in public spending. We …nd a positive and signi…cant sign for the parameter associated with the GDP growth rate, which indicates the e¤ect of economic conjuncture. Results also tend to show that urbanization actually increases public spending needs. The coe¢ cient associated with the central government transfers is also positively correlated with the level of public expenditure, as it is generally the case for trade openness.
3 5 The empirical evidence for public spending interactions and their strategic complementarity relates to the United States (Case, Rosen, and Hines, 1993 and Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid, 1999) , European countries (Redoano, 2007) , Indonesia (Arze, Martinez-Vasquez, and Puwanti, 2008) or French municipalities (Foucault, Madies, and Paty, 2008) . For empirical evidence of yardstick competition see Ashworth and Heyndels (1997) for Flemish Belgium, Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) for Italy, Schaltegger and Kuttel (2002) for Switzerland and Revelli (2006) for the United Kingdom. coe¢ cients associated with weighted average vector of public expenditure in neighboring provinces for the various categories of public spending, interactions seem to be strongest and most signi…cant for the category "appropriation for capital construction" and for "ex- 
The e¤ect of the degree of centralization on strategic interactions
As already stated, according to Proposition 1, when the …scal system is centralized, local o¢ cials'public spending choices are independent of what other agents are doing so that we do not expect any horizontal strategic interactions. We cannot test this hypothesis directly since we lack data for the period before decentralization. So we propose to test the e¤ect of the degree of centralization on the existence of horizontal strategic interactions. The horizontal strategic interactions should be lower when the degree of centralization is higher.
To test this, we interact the neighbors'spending decisions (A jt ) and an indicator of the degree of centralization (C it ) and we estimate:
If the centralization actually reduces strategic interactions, we should observe the coe¢ -cients 0 being signi…cantly positive and 00 being signi…cantly negative. To rely on insights derived from our theoretical model, …scal centralization is de…ned as transfers from central government as a percentage of local government revenue. (1) and (2)). Indeed, central government transfers have reduces competition between governors: the coe¢ cient associated with the interaction between the neighbors' spending decisions (A jt ) and an indicator of centralization (C it ) is signi…cantly negative while coef…cients associated with (A jt ) and (C it ) are both positive. As a robustness test, we use an approximation of …scal decentralization and evaluate its e¤ect on the existence of strategic interactions in columns (3) and (4). Following the relevant literature, 36 we choose an usual approximation of …scal decentralization, Dec it : local expenditure as a percentage of national expenditure. 37 As expected, on the contrary, public spending interactions are reinforced by …scal decentralization. For both matrices, coe¢ cients associated with A jt and (A jt Dec it ) are signi…cantly positive. 38
Conclusion
There is a divergence between the assumptions of orthodox …scal federalism theories and the institutional realities in China so that these theories cannot explain that …scal decentralization induced incentives to promote local economic growth in China. Our work …lls a gap in the existing literature by providing an explanation of the existence of competition among 3 6 In particular, Huther and Shah (1998), Fisman and Gatti (2002) , Arikan (2004) , Treisman (2000) , Rodríguez-Pose and Krøijer (2009) or Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) in their studies of the e¤ects of …scal decentralization on governance, corruption, growth and political institutions.
3 7 More precisely, we use the ratio of local government's public spending per capita over the total central government public spending per capita, for each province.
3 8 Note that we tested the joint signi…cance of the coe¢ cients. Generally, a necessary assumption for the existence of interjurisdictional competition is that local governments are directly elected by the constituents. Moreover, the …scal decentralization process has to be total. In China, on the contrary, it is the centralized political system associated with the decentralized …scal system which seems to ensure political accountability of local leaders and leads to competition between local authorities. Indeed, we formally show that principals can use yardstick competition to increase local agents' performance whether the principals are local voters or central leaders. Finally, an alternative explanation for local o¢ cials'increasing e¤orts to promote growth is the system's enduring centralization. We may wonder if control by the citizens is always more e¤ective than control from the center. Strict dominance arguments rule out any equilibrium in which G(C i ; b) = C i as long as < 1
If the central government observes G i = C i , it will always believe that the local government is good and reappoints him:
If the central government observes
, it will always believe that the local government is bad with probability 1, so, we have:
Hence, we establish by applying strict dominance argument that local governments will never play
Indeed, playing G i = C i gets less rent with no gain in the probability of staying governor. Hence, a bad local governor will always sets
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2: Decentralized …scal system without yardstick competition (with p L > 1=2)
First, we show that, by applying strict dominance arguments rule, we are always left with cases in which G(
and that (G 1 ) = 1 and (G 4 ) = (G 5 ) = 0:
-Strict dominance arguments rule out any equilibrium in which G(
Hence, the central government will always believe that a local o¢ cial who sets G 1 is good with probability 1. Indeed, the probability that a local government is good given a choice G 1 is
-If, the central government observes G 4 or G 5 , it will always believe that the local o¢ cial is bad with probability 1, or in other terms
and then we have
Hence, we establish by applying strict dominance argument that local governments will never play G( L ; b) = G 4 since it gets less rent than playing G 5 with no gain in the probability of reappointment.
A local government will always chooses
Second, we consider the case where p L > 1=2 and show that Proposition 2 de…nes a Perfect Bayesien Equilibrium -Using Bayes'rule, if the central government observes G 3 , it believes that a local governor is good with the following probability
which is higher or equal to if p L > 1=2, so that the central government is willing to reappoint a local government who sets G 3 , in other terms we have
-Since by assumption > 1=2; when M a local government never …nds it worthwhile to deviate from G 3 ( ) to G 4 (2 ) given that he will not then be reappointed.
So we have
-When H , it is always worse o¤ playing G 2 since it gets less rent than playing G 3 with no gain in the probability of reappointment (whether the central government reappoint a local government who sets G 2 or not).
So, we have
-Lastly, under the proposed strategy
Third, we show that Proposition 2 de…nes the unique Perfect Bayesien Equilibrium when p L > 1=2: After applying strict dominance arguments rule, we are left with cases in which G( H ; b) = G 2 or G 3 and G( M ; b) = G 3 or G 4 . So, we have three other strategy pro…les to consider:
This strategy pro…le is not rational. A bad local government will reduce its rent and provide G 3 when M only if the central government is willing to reappoint an o¢ cial who sets G 3 . Under the proposed strategy pro…le, using Bayes'rule, the central government will actually reappoint a local government who sets
However, in this case, when H , a bad local government will play G 3 since playing G 2 gets less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment.
-G ( H ; b) = G 3 and G( M ; b) = G 4 . This strategy pro…le cannot be rational given the belief system and the belief system consistent given the strategy pro…le. A bad local government will take a maximal rent and provide G 4 when M only if the central government is not willing to reappoint a local government who sets G 3 . But, under the proposed strategy pro…le, using Bayes'rule, the central government will reappoint an o¢ cial who sets
Once again, as previously, a bad local government will provide G 4 when M only if the central government is not willing to reappoint a local government who sets G 3 . But, under the proposed strategy pro…le, using Bayes' rule, the central government will reappoint an o¢ cial who sets
The full characterization of the equilibrium is available upon request.
A. Both local governments are good
Good local governors always play:
So, we have 8 < :
Both local governments are bad
We consider the case where p L > 1=2. Using Bayes' rule, if the central government observes G 3 in both jurisdictions, it believes that a local governor is good with the following probability
which is true since > 1=2. In this case, the central government is willing to reappoint a local government who sets G 3 if it observes G 3 in both jurisdictions (G 3 jG 3 ) = 1
Since by assumption > 1=2; when M a local government does not …nd it worthwhile to raise its rent given that he will not then be reappointed. So we have
When H , playing G 2 gets less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment so that
Then, under the proposed strategy pro…le, if the central government observes G 2 in both jurisdictions, it believes that a local governor is good with the following probability
One local government is good and the other is bad
Good local governors always play: G( k ; g) = t k : The bad o¢ cial will be found out by providing a level of public spending above his neighbor's
Hence, the bad local government will always take the maximal rent when the product is medium or low:
-If the central government observes G 3 in one jurisdictions and G 2 in another, it knows that the local governor who sets G 3 is bad. Now, playing G 3 when M gets less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment so that the bad local government plays:
-If the central government observes G 2 in one jurisdictions and G 1 in another, it knows that the local governor who sets G 2 is bad. Playing G 2 when L gets less rent with no gain in the probability of reappointment. The bad local government takes the maximal rent: R o b u st sta n d a rd e rro rs a re in b ra cke ts.* * * : c o e ¢ c ie nt sig n i…c a nt a t 1 % le ve l, * * : a t 5 % le ve l, * : a t 1 0 % le ve l.
We u se M L -E stim a tio n w ith sp e c i…c e ¤e c ts. T h e ro b u st A n se lin te sts fo r sp a tia l la g d e p e n d e n c e a n d fo r sp a tia l e rro r d e p e n d e n c e a re b a se d o n th e L a g ra n g e M u tip lie r p rin c ip le a n d re q u ire o n ly th e O L S re sid u a ls fro m th e n o n -sp a tia l m o d e l. R o b u st sta n d a rd e rro rs a re in b ra cke ts.* * * : c o e ¢ c ie nt sig n i…c a nt a t 1 % le ve l, * * : a t 5 % le ve l, * : a t 1 0 % le ve l. We u se o n e -ste p ro b u st G M M -E stim a tio n . We a d o p t th e a ssu m p tio n o f w e a k e x o g e n e ity o f G D P g row th ra te , tra d e o p e n n e ss, fo re ig n d ire c t inve stm e nt in ‡ow a n d c e ntra l g ove rn m e nt tra n sfe rs a n d th e a ssu m p tio n o f stric t e x o g e n e ity o f p o p u la tio n d e n sity, tre n d a n d u rb a n iz a tio n ra te . T h e w e ig hte d ave ra g e ve c to r o f p e r c a p ita p u b lic sp e n d in g in o th e r p rov in c e s is a lso in stru m e nte d by th e w e ig hte d ave ra g e o f n e ig hb o rs' c o ntro l va ria b le s. We c o lla p se in stru m e nts a n d lim it its nu m b e r. R o b u st sta n d a rd e rro rs a re in b ra cke ts.* * * : c o e ¢ c ie nt sig n i…c a nt a t 1 % le ve l, * * : a t 5 % le ve l, * : a t 1 0 % le ve l. We u se o n e -ste p ro b u st G M M -E stim a tio n . We a d o p t th e a ssu m p tio n o f w e a k e x o g e n e ity o f G D P g row th ra te , tra d e o p e n n e ss, fo re ig n d ire c t inve stm e nt in ‡ow a n d c e ntra l g ove rn m e nt tra n sfe rs a n d th e a ssu m p tio n o f stric t e x o g e n e ity o f p o p u la tio n d e n sity, tre n d a n d u rb a n iz a tio n ra te . T h e w e ig hte d ave ra g e ve c to r o f p e r c a p ita p u b lic sp e n d in g in o th e r p rov in c e s is a lso in stru m e nte d by th e w e ig hte d ave ra g e o f n e ig hb o rs' c o ntro l va ria b le s. We c o lla p se in stru m e nts a n d lim it its nu m b e r. R o b u st sta n d a rd e rro rs a re in b ra cke ts.* * * : c o e ¢ c ie nt sig n i…c a nt a t 1 % le ve l, * * : a t 5 % le ve l, * : a t 1 0 % le ve l. We u se o n e -ste p ro b u st G M M -E stim a tio n . We a d o p t th e a ssu m p tio n o f w e a k e x o g e n e ity o f G D P g row th ra te , tra d e o p e n n e ss, fo re ig n d ire c t inve stm e nt in ‡ow a n d c e ntra l g ove rn m e nt tra n sfe rs a n d th e a ssu m p tio n o f stric t e x o g e n e ity o f p o p u la tio n d e n sity, tre n d a n d u rb a n iz a tio n ra te . T h e w e ig hte d ave ra g e ve c to r o f p e r c a p ita p u b lic sp e n d in g in o th e r p rov in c e s is a lso in stru m e nte d by th e w e ig hte d ave ra g e o f n e ig hb o rs' c o ntro l va ria b le s. We c o lla p se in stru m e nts a n d lim it its nu m b e r. R o b u st sta n d a rd e rro rs a re in b ra cke ts.* * * : c o e ¢ c ie nt sig n i…c a nt a t 1 % le ve l, * * : a t 5 % le ve l, * : a t 1 0 % le ve l. We u se o n e -ste p ro b u st G M M -E stim a tio n .. We a d o p t th e a ssu m p tio n o f w e a k e x o g e n e ity o f G D P g row th ra te , tra d e o p e n n e ss, fo re ig n d ire c t inve stm e nt in ‡ow a n d c e ntra l g ove rn m e nt tra n sfe rs a n d th e a ssu m p tio n o f stric t e x o g e n e ity o f p o p u la tio n d e n sity, tre n d a n d u rb a n iz a tio n ra te . T h e w e ig hte d ave ra g e ve c to r o f p e r c a p ita p u b lic sp e n d in g in o th e r p rov in c e s is a lso in stru m e nte d by th e w e ig hte d ave ra g e o f n e ig hb o rs' c o ntro l va ria b le s. We c o lla p se in stru m e nts a n d lim it its nu m b e r.
A.2.3 Estimation results -Extension
A.2.4 Estimation results -Decentralization and strategic interactions. R o b u st sta n d a rd e rro rs a re in b ra cke ts.* * * : c o e ¢ c ie nt sig n i…c a nt a t 1 % le ve l, * * : a t 5 % le ve l, * : a t 1 0 % le ve l. We u se o n e -ste p ro b u st G M M -E stim a tio n . We a d o p t th e a ssu m p tio n o f w e a k e x o g e n e ity o f G D P g row th ra te , tra d e o p e n n e ss, fo re ig n d ire c t inve stm e nt in ‡ow a n d c e ntra l g ove rn m e nt tra n sfe rs a n d th e a ssu m p tio n o f stric t e x o g e n e ity o f p o p u la tio n d e n sity, tre n d a n d u rb a n iz a tio n ra te . T h e w e ig hte d ave ra g e ve c to r o f p e r c a p ita p u b lic sp e n d in g in o th e r p rov in c e s is a lso
